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Abstract 
 
 
We explore US covert forcible actions against democratic governments and their citizens and 
show that inter-democratic use of covert force is common and can be accommodated within the 
theory of democratic peace. Grounded in the Perceptual Theory of Legitimacy, we argue that 
democracies are constrained by public perceptions of their legitimacy from overtly aggressing 
against other democratic states. When democracies desire to aggress against their democratic 
counterparts they will do so covertly. We test the assumptions of the theory and its implication 
with (1) laboratory studies of the conflation of democracy with ally status, and (2) historical 
analyses of covert militarized actions and prisoner detention, which show that US forcible 
actions, when carried out against democracies and their citizens, are carried out clandestinely. 
 
Abstract: 123 words 
 
  
Covert	Wars	and	Democratic	Peace—3		
	
Covert Operations, Wars, Detainee Destinations, and the  
Psychology of Democratic Peace 
 
 The dearth of open militarized disputes between advanced democracies does not mean 
that democratic foreign policies direct no violence against each other. Advanced democratic 
states have a documented history of employing coercion against isolated and weaker 
democracies. The security and economic interests of advanced democracies, the expectation of 
an easy victory, and perceived political dissimilarities can supersede the normative pull of the 
democratic concord (Henderson 2002; James and Mitchell, 1995; Kim 2005; Reiter and Stam 
2002; Van Evera 1990). 
 The “war on terror” has put the democratic peace theory (DPT) to yet another test by 
marking a notable shift in the powers of Western security services and the range and nature of 
their clandestine operations. Pressed to develop a policy in response to the events of 9/11, the 
Bush administration’s policies afforded security services unprecedented levels of autonomy to 
kill, detain, transfer to other jurisdictions, and otherwise abuse the rights of terrorist subjects. 
Reports from the US Senate and the Bush administration’s secret memorandums revealed that 
the subjects of extraordinary rendition and victims of enhanced interrogation techniques included 
citizens of democratic states (Ramsay 2010; Senate Armed Services, 2008). European Parliament 
investigations uncovered cooperation between European secret services and the US extraordinary 
renditions programs (European Parliament, 2007). The extrajudicial transfers of terrorist suspects 
continued with reduced frequency under the Obama administration, which has also given the 
security services discretion in the apprehension and killing of “terrorists”, including by targeting 
suspects with drones. 
 Why would democracies engage in violent covert actions against other democratic states 
and their citizens? The variety of inter-democratic violence and coercive actions short of war 
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have been viewed as a critical challenge to DPT arguments, especially its normative propositions 
(Downes and Lilley 2010). American military interventions against other democratic regimes 
constitute “the starkest empirical anomalies for democratic peace” (Kinsella 2005, 455). If the 
US government uses force covertly against other democracies, how can we reconcile this with of 
the absence of overt war between democratic states? 
DPT scholars have tried to resolve these apparent discrepancies in inter-democratic 
violence and covert operations in three ways. First, there is a definitional issue; one may argue 
that covert operations fall below the threshold for violence and do not amount to war. Second, 
one can impugn the democratic nature of a state targeted for violence; they are perceived as non-
democratic by the aggressing state. Finally, the very nature of covert operations—hidden from 
the public eye—make them consistent with the democratic peace because they imply the concern 
of the democratic leaders with public opinion and fear of political consequences for the 
unpopular attack on another democracy (Kim & Kundt, 2012).  
The studies in this paper develop arguments consistent with the third “clandestine 
hypothesis.” We contend that the inter-democratic use of covert force can be accommodated 
within the principles of liberal democratic peace. We foreground liberal ideology, and discuss 
how the expectations of congruence between individuals’ liberal preferences and democratic 
governments’ policies constitute an important part of their thinking. Our arguments are based on 
the Perceptual Theory of Legitimacy (PToL, Crandall & Beasley, 2001): Decisions to use covert 
action results from the normative and institutional constraints through the dynamic process of 
sustaining popular consent in the legitimacy of democratic government. The latter is constrained 
by public perceptions of its legitimacy from overtly aggressing against democracies. To the 
extent that democracies desire to aggress against other democratic actors they will tend to do so 
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covertly. 
We first establish the perceptual tendency for citizens to see US allies as more democratic 
(Study 1), and we establish the causal relationship between these tendencies through a controlled 
experiment (Study 2).  We then demonstrate a behavioral tendency on the part of the US to 
prefer covert action when aggressing against more democratic targets.  We examine this in two 
contexts: U.S. covert interventions 1949-2000 (Study 3), and US renditions of detainees in the 
war on terror (Study 4).   
Theory 
DPT 
The assertion that democracies, while no less war prone, rarely fight one another has 
generated an avalanche of empirical and theoretical research (Maoz and Russett 1993; Oneal and 
Russet 1999a; Owen 1994) and stimulated theoretical and methodological discussions (Morgan 
and Schwebach 1992; Mousseau 2009; Rosato 2003; Ungerer 2012). The structural or 
institutional accounts of DPT identify various democratic institutions, procedures, and processes 
that enhance the accountability of policy makers to the public, legislatures, and interest groups. 
As a result, use of large-scale violence is both politically costly and inefficient (deMesquita et 
al., 1999; Rosato 2003; Ungerer 2012; for the critique of institutional explanations see Maoz and 
Russett 1993; Morgan and Schwebach 1992). Normative accounts of democratic peace maintain 
that democratic culture, liberal ideology, and democratic norms, once externalized, steer 
democracies away from the use of violence against their own people (Rosato 2003). Recent years 
have seen the advent of several new accounts of inter-democratic peace. The informational 
hypothesis is that the openness and transparency of democratic institutions enable them to send 
and receive costly signals, which allows democracies to resolve disputes at lower levels of 
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hostilities (Levy & Razin 2004). The preferential logic, derived from social identity theory, 
posits a strong correlation between domestic institutions and foreign policy choices and expects 
democracies to have similar foreign policy preferences. Finally, the perceptions-based argument 
requires democracies to perceive their counterparts as similarly democratic for peace between 
them to hold (Owen 1997; Oren 2013).   
Although, debates about what constitutes a war and what counts as democracy continue 
(Owen 1994; Tures, 2002), critics of DPT argue that both institutional and normative 
mechanisms should avert democracies from the use of direct physical force in any form, 
including war, military interventions, assassinations, small-scale aggression, torture, and the 
threats of force (Downes & Lilley 2010; Layne 1994; Reiter & Stam 2002).  Contrary to these 
expectations, democracies have frequently employed a wide range of coercive behavior in their 
relations with other democratic states. Covert use of force has become a hotly contested 
instrument of contemporary statecraft advocated by security advisers in democratic nations. The 
US in particular has resorted to covert military activities and clandestine interventions against 
other elected governments, and supported coercive actions against individuals under the pretext 
of the “war on terror” (Forsythe 1992; Kegley & Hermann 1995; Kim & Kundt, 2012). 
 The significance of these debates has been elevated by the close interplay of DPT 
scholarship with security strategies and foreign policies of democratic states (Ish-Shalom, 2008). 
In the US, the idea of democratic peace informed the Clinton administration’s strategy of 
“democratic enlargement” for fostering international peace and became the cornerstone of the 
security strategy under the Bush administration. However, the use of DPT arguments for 
legitimizing US intervention in Iraq was followed by the revelations of torture of POWs, drone 
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wars, and several covert operations accompanying the American quest for international 
democratization, rekindling debate about the conduct of democracies (Goldstein, 2011). 
Some contend inter-democratic clandestine operations short of open war constitute an 
aberration for DPT, particularly its normative logic (Rosato 2003; James & Mitchell 1995; Van 
Evera 1990). We differ; inter-democratic covert operations involving the use of force can be 
accommodated within DPT. In the context of covert operations and extraordinary renditions 
against other democratic states and their citizens, we show how decisions concerning war and 
peace are motivated by the interest in building and sustaining popular consent in the legitimacy 
of democratic government.  
Perceptual Theory of Legitimacy   
The core of democratic peace relies on liberal ideas about autonomous individuals 
capable of defining and pursuing their interests in self-preservation and wellbeing (Doyle 2005; 
Oneal & Russett 1999). Freedom is required for the pursuit of these interests, and peace is a 
prerequisite for freedom. Since violence and coercion are inimical to freedom, individuals are 
predisposed to value peace (Owen 1994).  In liberal political theory, individuals and their 
interests are thought to exist prior to politics, but they can advance their interests through 
collective action and participation in the institutional framework of a democratic state 
(Moravcsik 1997). The underlying interests of democratic citizens are not only expected to 
constrain state policies but also to define the social identity of democracy. Together, the social 
identity, interests, and preferences specify the legitimate order in a democratic state (Moravcsik 
1997).  	
A government’s legitimacy can be construed as a result of a psychological process, where 
individuals’ perceptions of the moral worth of the government and its actions constitute 
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elemental parts of their perceptual field. According to the PToL, legitimacy is conferred when 
the moral value of a nation and governmental actions are consistent with each other (roughly 
equal) (Crandall & Beasley 2001). The two essential propositions of the PToL relevant to the 
perceptions of legitimacy of a democratic government and its international conduct are 
“structural balance” and “unit relationship” (Crandall et al., 2007). The principle of structural 
balance, which also underpins the perceptual logic of DPT (Owen 1997), stipulates that 
individuals are motivated to have an affectively uniform impression of their own states or other 
nations and their peoples; citizens wish to avoid ambivalence and inconsistency among related 
objects or events. People are motivated to put positive elements together and negative elements 
together: democracies are “good” (Sen, 1999) and all things democratic are good as well, 
whereas non-democracies are bad (or at least worse than democracies), and non-democratic 
governments and people have lesser moral value (Falomir-Pichastor et al., 2011). 
 Affective consistency is important only among objects that belong together (e.g., actors 
and their deliberate choices, citizens and their government). Because citizens in a democracy are 
perceived to freely choose their governments, the government is in a “unit relationship” with the 
populace. The government and citizens are viewed as belonging together, or as two parts of the 
“whole.” By extension, the actions of the governments epitomize the choices of the citizens. If, 
however, the government policies go against the core of the state’s social identity represented in 
the citizens’ true interests in freedom, material wellbeing, and peace, individuals will experience 
affective inconsistency (how can a “good” government engage in “bad” behavior?). This 
perceptual inconsistency will force individuals to expend mental energy for a potentially 
unpleasant reevaluation of their cognitive and affective elements (“Is this legitimate leader of a 
good nation really a good person?”); inconsistency leads to the perception of illegitimacy.  
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 The PToL belongs to the family of consistency theories—such as balance theory (Heider 
1958) and cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957)—which are premised on the idea that 
people are motivated to seek coherent attitudes, beliefs, values, and behaviors. Inconsistencies 
result in aversive feelings or discomfort, and motivate people to make relevant cognitions 
consistent with one another. Cognitive dissonance theory has been prominent exemplar of 
consistency theories applied to the study of international relations and foreign policy (Jervis 
1976; Larson 1985; Snyder 1978). By contrast, the PToL draws more directly from Heiderian 
balance theory, in three particular ways. First we are more interested in the overall 
inconsistencies that are likely to be perceived as imbalanced, rather than the individual-level 
factors or situational contexts that are more likely to give rise to those inconsistencies. Second, 
we do not specify the degree of intensity with which individuals will feel cognitive 
inconsistencies, as does most cognitive dissonance theorizing, only that inconsistencies will give 
rise to efforts to reduce them. Thus drawing on balance theory offers a more concise approach.  
Third, and most important, we are positing a perceptual “unit relation” between governments and 
citizens, which is conceptually more similar to balance theory precepts, as cognitive dissonance 
theory does not directly specify which cognitive elements will be involved in arousing 
dissonance.   
 In sum, the PToL proposes that there is a desire to view things that belong together as 
affectively consistent. People are motivated to restore consistency either by changing the 
affective value of an object, or by changing the connectedness of objects (e.g., Beasley and 
Crandall, 2004; Heider, 1958; 1990). Legitimacy arises out of this consistency—when 
inconsistency persists, legitimacy suffers. Applied to democracy, the legitimacy of a democratic 
government arises out of the consistency of its institutions and actions with citizens’ 
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expectations. A democratic government, for example, is expected to allow the public to be 
represented in the decision making process, to have a voice in its assessment and evaluation, and 
to allow some control over the outcomes of governance (Lipset 1959). Individuals then extend 
their support to the government in exchange for institutions and policies that jibe with their 
preferences. These institutions and policies, as well as the government that epitomizes them, are 
harmonious in their value, and thereby legitimate. Since democratic governments are concerned 
about their legitimacy, their conduct regarding the use of force will be motivated in part by an 
effort to realize individuals’ interests in freedom and peace. 
We do not assume that citizens and leaders of democracies share the same interests and 
preferences, as many other DPT scholars do (see Hermann and Kegley 1995; Rosatto 2003). 
Even if the preferences of democratic citizens and leaders were uniform, it is not uncommon for 
the leaders’ preferences to be in tension with what they view as their state’s immediate political 
goals. The originator of republican peace, Immanuel Kant, himself feared that the republican 
governments would occasionally engage in non-liberal international conduct cloaked in liberal 
justifications (Doyle 1995). In the parlance of international relations, states’ preferences are 
causally independent of their strategies and tactics. Event if the democratic states’ preferences 
represent their citizens’ true concerns, their strategies and tactics are affected by the immediate 
political aims and external circumstances made up of threats, opportunities, and incentives 
(Moravcsik 1997; Rousseau, Gelpi, Reiter & Huth, 1996). 
 When faced with a dilemma of reconciling the incompatible preferences and policy 
options dictated by their state’s immediate political interests, democratic leaders will be 
constrained by the preferences of their people. While it has already been acknowledged that 
perceptions matter in the democratic comity, the jury is still out on precisely how the process 
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works to constrain belligerency among democracies. Our argument aligns with that of Jerrod 
Hayes (2012), who explains democratic peace through the mechanisms of constraints placed on 
political elites by the perceptions and expectations of their constituents unwilling to pick fights 
with members of a putative “in-group” as it arouses cognitive inconsistency in people. Hayes, 
however, does not articulate how these perceptions are created and sustained. According to the 
PToL, democratic citizens have positive evaluations of democracy (Falomir-Pichastoret al., 
2012) and they are connected by a unit relationship with their governments and other democratic 
nations. For reasons of cognitive consistency, they think that other democracies and their citizens 
are good. War against a democracy creates a highly inconsistent, deeply imbalanced perception, 
and is thus illegitimate. Democratic citizens also deserve commensurately positive treatment; 
their abuse or mistreatment is inconsistent with democratic comity.  
Since democratic governments are both constrained by and concerned with their popular 
legitimacy1, they will engage in acts of coercion and violence that are both psychologically and 
socially inconceivable only to the extent that they are able to (1) make their actions seem 
legitimate or (2) merely conceal them. When the creation of popular consent for openly coercive 
policies appears unattainable using the elaborate myths of legitimization, the democratic 
government may resort to covert force to evade ex ante due approval process and to avert the ex 
post de-legitimation and electoral retribution (Reiter and Stam 2002). 
 Therefore, in relations with other democracies, democratic states will be likely to 
substitute non-military and covert operations for direct military confrontation when these types 
of coercion serve their governments’ immediate political aims (Morgan and Palmer 2000; Most 																																																								1	Elites	in	democratic	states	feel	constrained	based	on	their	perception	of	what	the	public	will	and	will	not	accept.	An	extensive	literature	in	public	opinion	indicates	that	“…	[prospective]	public	opinion	exerts	a	constant	influence	as	leaders	anticipate	potential	future	public	reactions	to	their	current	policies”	(Baum	&	Potter	2008:	55).		Variations	in	dependence	on	public	consent	are	systematically	related	to	propensity	to	initiate	conflict	(Reiter	&	Tillman	2002).		
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and Starr 1984; Palmer, Wohlander, Morgan 2002). As a consequence, the connection between 
the democratic peace and covert operations will be inverted. This is the “clandestine hypothesis:” 
democratic states will use covert types of force against each other more often precisely because 
they desist from engaging in the open military hostilities and war with one another, as the overt 
use of force hurts legitimacy of democratic governments.2  
The Studies 
 In this paper we present four studies that test the causal mechanism of inter-democratic 
covert force informed by the PToL. In Study 1, we test whether US students perceive a 
correlation between the democracy level of a nation and its ally status. In Studies 2a/b we test 
whether knowing a nation is an ally causes US students to perceive it as a democracy, and that 
knowing a nation is a democracy causes US students to perceive it as an ally. In Study 3, we 
compare US militarized actions against democracies and non-democracies, to see how often 
these two kinds of disputes are carried out covertly. In Study 4, we compare the democracy level 
of the home nations of detainees in the US “war on terror,” and test whether more democratic 
“origins” increase the probability of extraordinary rendition.  
 Study 1: Perceptions of Allies and Democracies 
To the extent that individuals view the US as both good and democratic, they should also 
view countries related to the US in a more favorable light; allies should be seen as democratic, 
and democracies should be seen as allies. These results should manifest as a positive correlation 
																																																								2	Although	we	make	no	explicit	claims	regarding	the	“rationality”	of	state	behavior	and	the	use	of	covert	operations,	the	PToL	predicts	a	different	frequency	of	covert	activities	when	democracies	are	dealing	with	democratic	versus	non-democratic	governments.		A	rational	choice	of	foreign	policy	tools	would	expect	there	to	be	no	difference	in	the	rate	of	covert	force	by	democracies	toward	other	democratic	or	non-democratic	states.	The	use	of	covert	force	toward	democracies	implicates	leaders’	sensitivity	to	public	perceptions,	which	the	PToL	explains.	
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between perceptions of the US, perceived alliance with and similarity to the US, and perceived 
level of democracy among the countries of the world.  
Method 
Data came from 190 self-identifying US citizens in an undergraduate course at the 
University of Kansas in the spring of 2007. Participants were told they would be filling out a 
questionnaire regarding their perceptions of several different countries within the United 
Nations.  
Each participant received a one-page questionnaire consisting of five or six UN member 
states grouped at random. The 33 different questionnaires provided brief innocuous information 
for each target nation (e.g., location, population, GDP, exports). In all 190 of the 192 member 
nations were rated (excluding the US and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, because of its 
name). 
 Participants answered four questions: How important is this country on the world stage, 
how similar is this country to the United States, how democratic is this country, and what level 
of relation does this country hold with the United States. Participants then completed two items 
examining their perceptions of the United States: “The United States is the greatest nation in the 
world,” and “How democratic is the United States government?”  
Results and Discussion  
 Perceptions of democracy and alliance with the US were correlated, r=.23, p< .001 n=190 
(see Figure 1). Because Iraq was an outlier and relations with the US were complex in 2007, we 
removed it, with r=.26, p<.001 n=189. As perceived levels of either democracy or alliance 
increased so did the other in way that promoted a balanced state. The perception of a nation’s 
alliance with the U.S. was correlated with perceived similarity to the US r=.63 (see Table 1).The 
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target nation’s perceived importance and alliance with the US were correlated r=.24, and there 
was a correlation between a target nation’s perceived importance and similarity to the US, r=.69.  
Consistent with the PToL, our participants believed that US allies were similar to the US, 
they are democracies and were important on the world stage; our participants showed 
consistency when forming their perceptions of foreign governments and global relationships. 
These correlations are not large, and they cannot demonstrate causal linkages. In Study 2a, we 
experimentally manipulate the historical democracy status of Iran, and measure whether or not 
students perceive it to be an ally when it is a democracy. Simultaneously, in Study 2b we 
perform the mirror image of this experiment by manipulating whether or not Iran was an ally, 
and measuring whether or not students perceive Iran to be a democracy.  
Studies 2a and 2b: Causal Connection Between Democracy and Ally Status 
 Design and participants. Two simultaneous and independent experiments were run. Each 
participant read a vignette about Iranian history and its relations with the US across two decades, 
the 1970s and the 1980s. In Study 2a, we manipulated the ally status of the US and Iran, and 
measured participants’ perception of Iran’s democracy level.  In Study 2b, we manipulated the 
democracy level of Iran, and measured participants’ perception of Iran’s ally status with the US. 
Within each study, there were two conditions. In Study 2a, Iran was described as an ally in the 
1970s and an adversary in the 1980s, or alternatively an adversary in the 1970s and an ally in the 
1980s. Similarly, in Study 2b, Iran was either described as a democracy in the 1970s and an 
autocracy in the 1980s, or as an autocracy in the 1970s and as a democracy in the 1980s.  
 In this way, democracy or ally status are manipulated within subject, so that each person 
in Study 2a evaluates Iranian democracy both when an ally and an adversary; each person in 
Study 2b evaluates Iranian-US ally status both as a democracy and as an autocracy. This 
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enhances the statistical power of the experiment, and provides what is an independent replication 
built into the study. Because our participants were mostly ignorant of Iranian history, whether we 
describe Iran as a democracy (or an ally) in the 1970s vs. the 1980s is relatively arbitrary, and so 
the two conditions within studies serve as independent replications of each other.  The 
participants were 113 KU undergraduates, 54 in Study 2a, and 59 in Study 2b.  
 To test knowledge about Iran, we asked four general knowledge questions. Two were 
open-ended: the most common language in Iran (Farsi) and the year the Islamic Republic was 
founded (1979). We asked two multiple-choice questions, “The word  ‘mullah’ is best translated 
as Leader, Dictator, Priest, or General,” and  “Which of the following countries does NOT share 
a border with Iran? Afghanistan, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, or Turkey.” 
 Vignettes. Participants read a brief and accurate historical account of Iran, beginning with 
Cyrus the Great, the 11th century Turkish invasion and Genghis Khan’s Mongol invasion. When 
the account reached the 20th century, the manipulations (and historical inaccuracies) were 
introduced. In Study 2a, the vignettes gave substantial information about the ally status of Iran 
and the U.S. (which changed from 1970s to the 1980s), but introduced no information about 
Iran’s level of democracy. In Study 2b, the vignettes gave substantial information about Iran’s 
democracy level, but gave no information about relations with the US. 
 At the end of each vignette, to separate what they might know of Iran-U.S. relations 
today, participants were told “A lot of time has elapsed since the 1980’s and change continued to 
take place in Iran over the years,” and “Iran continues to be an important player of on the world 
stage.”   
 Dependent variables. For Study 2a, the critical dependent variable read “How much of an 
ally was Iran to the United States?” with a 1-4 response scale labeled “Not an ally at all” (1), “A 
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limited ally” (2), A partial ally” (3), and “A major ally” (4). This question was answered twice, 
once with the predicting instruction “Please answer the following questions about Iran during the 
1970s [1980s], when Iran was a democracy,” and one with the instructions “Please answer the 
following questions about Iran during the 1980s [1970s], when the country was presided over by 
an unelected mullah.” 
 For Study 2b, the critical dependent variable read “How democratic is the Iranian 
government?” with a 1-4 response scale labeled “No democracy at all” (1), “A very limited 
democracy“ (2), “A partial democracy” (3), and “A complete democracy” (4). This question was 
answered twice, once with the predicting instruction “Please answer the following questions 
about Iran during the 1970s, when the USA and Iran were allies. […when the US and Iran were 
not allies]” and one with the instructions “Please answer the following questions about Iran 
during the 1980s, when the alliance between the country had ended …when the US and Iran had 
become allies].” 
Results and Discussion 
     Knowledge. Knowledge of Iran was very low, with a modal score of zero (50.8% of 
participants, mean=0.76% correct), and only 5.1% of participants answered all four correctly. 
Most participants did not have enough knowledge to reject our version of Iranian history. 
(Results were virtually identical when knowledgeable participants were removed; no participants 
were dropped for these analyses.) 
 For both Studies 2a and 2b, the main dependent variable was analyzed with a 2 (Decade) 
X 2 (Ally/Democracy status) mixed model ANOVA. Because in both studies the critical test is 
between decades (but different decades for the two conditions), the interaction term is the 
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appropriate hypothesis test; the two main effects test the effect of counterbalancing. The results 
are displayed in Figures 2a and 2b. 
     Inferring ally status from democracy. For Study 2a, there was no main effect comparing 
democracy status in the 1970s vs. the 1980s, F(1,49)=2.44, p=.125, and the order in which 
democracy vs. autocracy occurred, F<1. The hypothesized interaction occurred, F(1,49)=5.24, 
p=.026, η=.31, see Figure 2a. Participants tended to perceive Iran as an ally when it was a 
democracy, as compared to when it was an autocracy. 
          Inferring democracy from ally status. For Study 2b, there was no main effect comparing 
ally status in the 1970s vs. the 1980s, and the order in which ally vs. adversary occurred, both 
F’s<1. The hypothesized interaction occurred, F(1,57)=21.50, p<.0001, η=.57, see Figure 2b. 
Participants tended to perceive Iran as a democracy when it was an ally, as compared to when it 
was not. 
 Studies 2a and 2b show that our participants inferred quite strongly and reliably that 
democracy and being an ally of the U.S. go hand-in-hand. These two studies show that knowing 
a country is a democracy causes US students to believe that country is our ally, and conversely, 
knowing that a country is our ally causes them to believe that country is a democracy. Our 
participants showed a reliable pattern of perceiving consistency—good things (e.g., democracy) 
belong with other good things (e.g., alliance with the US).  
 These data have an ironic flavor, as the particular history of relations between the US and 
Iran is a counter-example to the experiment. The period of time since WWII of closest relations 
between the US and Iran coincide with the period of least democracy in Iran (Abrahamian, 2013; 
Patrikarakos, 2013). The era preceding our closest relations (prior to the 1953 US-sponsored 
coup) and the era of mutual discontent (from the 1979 Islamic Revolution to the present) 
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represent a syncretic blend of constitutional democracy and theocracy (Juergensmeyer, 2008). 
Nevertheless, our participants intuited exactly the opposite of reality, as a way of maintaining 
consistency between ally and democracy status. The US does not exclusively seek for allies 
among democracies; our participants behave as if this might be so. 
Study 3: Democratic Warfare and US Covert Action 
 To restate the PToL, US citizens view democracy as good, and people in democracies are 
in unit relationship with their governments, so people in democracies are good. War is not good, 
so war against democracies creates inconsistency, and is thus illegitimate. To preserve legitimacy 
and engage in militarized hostilities toward another democracy, a democratic nation may (1) 
deny that it is a democracy, (2) deny that its target is a democracy, or (3) hide its actions from the 
public.  The first option is comparatively rare, the second option is popular (e.g., British response 
to Falklands/Malvinas invasion) but is not always possible (Kim & Hundt, 2012).  We 
investigated the third option, and compared overt and covert militaristic actions by the US to 
assess the level of democracy of the nations targeted by those actions. We hypothesize that the 
US engages in overt militarized international disputes or international war at a significantly 
greater rate against non-democracies than against democracies, but when the United States uses 
force against democracies, it will use covert force at greater rate than against non-
democracies.3  
Method 
																																																								3	The	1991	Intelligence	Authorization	Act	defines	covert	action	as	“an	activity	or	activities	conducted	by	an	element	of	the	United	States	Government	to	influence	political,	economic,	or	military	conditions	abroad	so	that	the	role	of	the	United	States	Government	is	not	intended	to	be	apparent	or	acknowledge	publicly”	(Scott	2004).	This	broad	sense	includes	the	use	of	covert	military	force	as	well	as	clandestine	efforts	by	the	US	government	to	influence	events	in	another	democracy	through	instigation	of	violence	or	support	for	the	use	of	force	again	a	democratically	elected	government	by	the	indigenous	forces	in	the	target	state.			
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 We used the Correlates of War Project (CoW; Ghoson & Palmer, 2003) to define the 
overt occurrences of militarized inter-state disputes (MID), the Polity IV dataset (Gurr, Jaggers, 
and Moore, 1989; Marshall and Jaggers, 2005) to ascertain the level of democracy of nations 
involved in the disputes (on a 0 -10 scale), and developed our own database of US-involved 
covert military operations from 1949 to 2000. 
Measuring Overt Military Operations 
 The CoW (Ghoson & Palmer 2003) lists all countries taking part in the dispute and the 
hostility level reached in this dispute. Hostility level ranged from 1, no militarized dispute, to 5, 
open war. Disputes rated 2 (threat of force) and higher were included in the analysis; this is a 
conservative estimate that errs on the side of the null hypothesis because it includes minor acts of 
aggression that the general public are less likely to pay attention to. The low level acts of 
aggression were included, however, as a match to the covert actions, which often fall far short of 
full-scale war. We followed the most common practice and used the combined Polity IV 
democracy-autocracy score to determine a country’s level of democracy (Bogaards, 2012).  
   Measuring Covert Military Operations 
 No comprehensive dataset was available that listed covert interventions taken by the US 
against foreign nations with a reliable classification of the use of force as “covert”, we set out to 
create our own4. To generate the list, we consulted several historical accounts of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and US interventions. To be included in the database, each action had 
to be considered a true intervention by at least three separate sources and needed to achieve a 
level of action as high or higher than threat of force (that is a standard comparable to the one 
used for overt MIDs).  																																																								
4 Downes & Lilley (2010), Forthythe (1992), and Van Evera (1990a) rely on declassified intelligence information in 
their qualitative studies of covert military acts without specifying the rules of inclusion/exclusion of the incidents.  
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To establish that the US intervention should indeed be considered covert, we developed a 
two-prong test. First, an action must have not also been listed as an MID by the CoW. Second, 
the covert actions identified in historical accounts and not listed in the CoW project were 
examined for major press coverage. Two research assistants, working independently, searched 
for news articles in New York Times and Washington Post relating to the actions, ranging from 
the time the action took place until a year after the action ended.  
Research assistants rated the level of “covertness” of each action, based on whether the 
action was mentioned at all in the newspapers, if it was mentioned as a US action, and if the US 
government took responsibility for the action. To be considered covert, actions had to either 
receive no mentions in either newspaper, or if the action was mentioned, the description must 
lack any connection to the US in the reporting. US involvement was scored as “covert” only if 
the US government denied involvement in the action. This method identified 27 cases of US 
covert intervention; they are enumerated in Table 2. 
Results and Discussion 
Table 3 displays the 27 covert actions and 231 overt MIDs by democracy status. Table 3 
differentiates between democracies and non-democracies in two ways. We defined democracies 
by an “inclusive” standard, with democracies scoring 0 or above on their Polity IV values, and 
we also defined democracies by a “strict” standard, using democracy scores of 7 and above5.  
Covert interventions in our dataset were comparatively rare, representing about 10% of 
all US interventions. (Some covert military actions may have occurred that are not included in 
Table 2, as by their very nature, the actions were concealed.) U.S. aggression against 
																																																								5	Although a score of 7 is relatively arbitrary, there exists no standard way of classifying countries in the relevant 
literature (for further discussion, see Bennett, 2006). What matters is that governmental elites are likely to see the 
country as democratic enough to anticipate objections from the public.	
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democracies was rare, ranging somewhere between 6-14% of all interventions, depending upon 
the standard.   
Nearly 90% of all US military interventions were overt, and using the inclusive standard, 
we found that against non-democracies this rate was about 94%. By contrast, covert operations 
were significantly more likely when intervening against democracies; although 6.3% of 
interventions against non-democracies were carried out covertly, a much larger 37% of 
interventions against democracies were carried out covertly, χ2(1df)=30.76, p<.0001.  
Alternatively, the US acted overtly almost 95% of the time when aggressing against non-
democracies compared to just 63% of the time it aggressed against democracies.  
Using the strict standard, the United States overt actions accounted for 91% of the 
interventions against non-democracies, compared to just 71% of the time it aggressed against 
democracies. Covert operations were again more likely to be used against democracies, 
representing 29% of all interventions, as compared to 9% of interventions against non-
democracies, χ2(1df))=6.97, p=.008. 
If we treat democracy as a continuous variable, the correlation between overt/covert 
status and level of democracy is rpb=.36, N=258, p<.0001. This provides an estimate of a fairly 
substantial effect size of democracy on enhancing the probability of a covert intervention.   
This continuous analysis is statistically stronger than those that rely on artificially 
dichotomized variables, but it highlights one aspect of our data set that needs discussion. The 
unit of statistical analysis is the historical incident, and it occasionally relies on more than one 
incident from the same country. For the 27 covert incidents, 22 countries are involved, five of 
which had two incidents, and all the rest had only one. For the 231 overt incidents, 40 countries 
are represented, of which 22 had two or more. Although the incidents are statistically 
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independent of each other for their overt/covert status, they are not independent with respect to 
democracy level (especially if those incidents occurred in the same year, for which only one 
Polity IV value exists). To solve this problem, we calculated average level of democracy and 
average level of covertness within nation (across all incidents; some nations received both overt 
and covert operations). This leaves 52 separate countries, with r=.29, p=.037, between the level 
of covertness and level of democracy. Whether analyzed at the level of incident or at the level of 
nation, as the democracy level of the target nation goes up, so too does the probability of a US 
intervention being carried out covertly—strong evidence in support of the clandestine 
hypothesis.  
Study 4: Democracy and Detention in the “War on Terror”  
 We now apply the PToL and the issue of democratic peace to the treatment of individuals 
from democracies and non-democracies. The US detention and interrogation policies applied to 
the so-called “enemy combatants” detained over the course of the “war on terrorism” have been 
a highly contentious issue (Cole, 2013). A result of the wartime decision making formalized in a 
series of presidential orders, memorandums, and legal memos, these policies contain guidelines 
for classifying lawful and unlawful combatants and allow for trials of the latter category of 
detainees in military tribunals, deny them the protection of the Geneva Conventions, and 
authorize the implementation of enhanced interrogation techniques against these prisoners by the 
US military personnel (Pfiffner 2009). Most of the individuals detained by the US military on the 
order of the US administration were placed in the Guantanamo Bay detention camp (Gitmo) 
established at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, and controlled by the US. Those detained 
during the war in Iraq were transferred to Abu Ghraib. In parallel to the US military operations, 
the CIA seized a number of persons in foreign territories suspected of hostile actions against the 
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US. Held incommunicado and without due process of law, these individuals were either placed in 
the CIA secret prisons (“Black Sites”), or transferred to states known for forced disappearances 
and torture (Boys, 2011; Forsythe, 2011), known as “extraordinary rendition.”  
  We studied people detained between 2001-2006 inclusive, sent either to Gitmo or 
extraordinary rendition. This was the period of widest interception and detention of prisoners, 
and in the case of prisoners sent to Gitmo are a matter of public record; the US Department of 
Defense released prisoner records on the Internet. By contrast, extraordinary rendition was a very 
secretive process; the US government has not released official records (Grey, 2006; Mayer, 
2005; Senate Select Committee, 2012/2014).  
 The choice between rendition and Guantanamo is a choice between covert and overt 
detention. This represents—at the individual level—the same choice of action as in the Study 3. 
When aggressive, war-like treatment of individuals takes place overtly, detainees are imprisoned 
where scrutiny is possible. When war-like treatment of individuals takes place covertly, 
detainees are handled away from public scrutiny.  
 We hypothesize that when people were detained in the “war on terror,” their subsequent 
treatment would be based partly on the democracy level of their country of origin. Because 
detention/ interrogation can be conceptualized as war at the individual level, the PToL suggests 
that the most vigorous forms of interrogation are not appropriate for “good” citizens of 
democracies. For these detainees, the US government will try to hide their interrogation and 
detention by having them subject to extraordinary rendition. We hypothesize that detainees from 
a democracy, ironically, are more likely to be subjected to extraordinary rendition than sent to 
Guantanamo Bay; suspects from non-democracies will be more likely to be publicly sent to 
Gitmo.  
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Method 
Participants in this study were in a very real sense unwilling—detainees picked up by the 
US in its “war on terror.” The detainees consisted of two separate groups for comparison and 
were obtained through two separated sources. The first group of detainees was those being held 
at the US detention camp at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base on the island of Cuba. Information 
concerning these detainees was obtained through a United States Department of Defense 
document procured off of their website (U.S. D.O.D., 2006). This list provided the names of 754 
individuals detained at Guantanamo Bay between January 2002 and May 2006, and also 
provided the detainee’s country of citizenship.  
 The second group of detainees was those that the US government had detained and 
rendered through the process of extraordinary rendition. Because extraordinary rendition 
operates covertly, the US Government does not provide online lists of those rendered. Instead, an 
accounting of rendered “participants” was obtained through a list based on reports from Human 
Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the ACLU, the Center for Human Rights and Global 
Justice at NYU, Guantanamo Files (Worthington, 2007) and Ghost Plane (Grey, 2006), and 
published online by Mother Jones (Bergen, 2008). This list named 53 individuals subject to 
extraordinary rendition from 2001-2006 (same window as for Gitmo). The list provided where 
they were rendered from and to, dates of the rendition, and detainee’s country of origin. 
 We used the Polity IV dataset to determine the detainees’ countries’ level of democracy 
(for the year of detention), using the same strict and inclusive standards as in Study 2. A small 
number of detainees carried passports from two nations, and these nations did not share the same 
Polity IV values. In these cases (e.g., Syrian-Spanish), we always used the higher democracy 
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level (e.g., Spain); the treatment of democracies that is the critical element in the PToL’s view of 
DPT. 
Results and Discussion 
We identified 807 people detained by the U.S. government in the “War on Terror;” they 
are categorized in Table 4 by democracy and detention status. Table 4 again differentiates 
between democracies and non-democracies using both an “inclusive” standard (democracy 
defined at 0 or above on Polity IV values), and a “strict” standard, (democracy defined at 7 or 
above). Extraordinary renditions made up just 6.6% of our detainee dataset.  
Over 90% of all detainees were sent to GITMO, and using the inclusive standard, we 
found that for detainees from non-democracies this rate was about 95%. By contrast, being 
extraordinarily rendered was significantly more likely when detainees were from democracies. 
About 5% of detainees from non-democracies were sent into extraordinary rendition, 21.2% of 
detainees from democracies were subject to extraordinary rendition, χ2(1df)=33.04, p<.001.  
Using the strict standard, the US sent detainees from non-democracies to GITMO in 
about 95% of the cases in which they were detained, compared to just under 77% of the time 
when detainees were from democracies. Extraordinary rendition was still more likely to be used 
against detainees from democracies, representing over 23% of all detentions, as compared to 
only 5.4% from non-democracies, χ2(1df)=24.69, p<.001.  The U.S. is substantially more likely to 
use extraordinary rendition for detainees from democracies. 
Because the list of detainees subjected to extraordinary rendition is less reliable than the 
list of Guantanamo detainees, we explicitly considered unreliability as a cause of our results. It is 
possible that the available data is biased in favor of under-reporting of individuals from non-
democracies who were extraordinarily rendered (e.g., citizens of failed states may go 
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unreported). To address this, we ran a “file drawer” test, a calculation to see how many detainees 
from non-democracies would be necessary to add to our observed rendition data to create 
statistical non-significance.  An additional 62 unreported detainees from non-democracies would 
be necessary for the results fall above the .05 level. This amount is nearly triple the size of the 
observed sample; a biased sample is an unlikely account.  
 Our data demonstrate an ironic disadvantage of democracy; the possession of a passport 
from a democracy substantially increases one’s chances, once detained, to be sent to the less 
desirable extraordinary rendition. As predicted by PToL and the clandestine account of DPT, 
citizens from democracies were treated with high rates of covert detention.  
General Discussion 
 These studies offer some compelling insights into the behavior of the US in relation to 
DPT.  In our first study, we established that individuals do indeed tend to balance their 
perceptions of the US, its allies, and their levels of democracy. In our second study, we showed 
that democracy and alliance with the US go hand-in-hand as a way of maintaining consistency; 
Americans see democracy in their allies, and they see alliance with other democracies. These 
sentiments of a democratic public, we argue, represent a constraint on decision makers. In the 
third study, we hypothesized that a logical consequence of citizens’ tendency toward perceptual 
balance on the international stage would result in a parallel tendency for the US to prefer covert 
action as the means of intervening against more democratic countries.  We found that the US is 
more likely to use covert intervention against democracies than against non-democracies. In our 
fourth study, we extended this behavioral tendency to the treatment of captured suspects in the 
“war on terror”.  We found that the US more often pursues covert detention against detainees 
from democracies than from non-democracies.  
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We argue that these foreign policy choices are rooted in US elites’ desire to avoid 
negative public sentiment, which in turn, is rooted in cognitive consistency, a premise of the 
PToL. Hayes’ (2012) and Weart’s (1998) analyses of democratic peace have illuminated how the 
needs for cognitive consistency affect perceptions of citizens and elites and constrain decision-
makers’ belligerent choices toward fellow democracies. These studies represent a helpful 
advance in articulating the plausible normative explanations of democratic peace focusing on 
public constraint and elite preference formation. By integrating the PToL with DPT, our study 
pushes this research agenda forward by explicating how perceptions of legitimacy are created 
and sustained in democratic states, and by showing how these perceptions serve as constraints on 
elites pondering a military solution to a dispute with another democracy and thus, inadvertently, 
prompting them to resort to clandestine subversive behavior and the use of covert military force. 
PToL emphasizes consistency among relations in the simplest terms; the principle that 
“bad people deserve bad treatment . . . and good people deserve good treatment (Crandall and 
Beasley 2001, p.79)” is fundamental to judgments of justice and legitimacy. This simple 
balancing of moral affect and treatment—structural balance—provides a basis for understanding 
the mechanisms of DPT (see also Hart, 1974). Citizens of democracies are from “good” 
countries that are US allies, and the close relationship between democratic citizens and their 
nation mandate good treatment. When US government policy and interests lead to harsh 
treatment of democratic citizens, the government risks its legitimacy. To preserve legitimacy it 
hides its actions, prosecuting wars and detainees in the twilight. 
These support the “clandestine” hypothesis advanced in this research and the perceptual 
logic of DPT suggested in the paper. We might consider the 1953 coup d'état in Iran orchestrated 
by the US and UK, or the 1954 Guatemalan coup d'état that deposed the democratically-elected 
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president by an anti-Communist “army” recruited, trained, and armed by the CIA, or the “secret 
wars” of the Reagan Administration against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua as 
illustrations of this logic. The clandestine war cases were selected for their “covertness”, i.e., 
these operations were either silenced in press or, if mentioned in newspaper reports, ruled out 
any connection between the US and the violence. The cases also indicate the concern of the US 
leaders with public opinion and the fear of political and reputational consequences for an 
unpopular attack on another democratic state. In some instances, elites from both the invading 
and target states were aware of the nature and goals of the covert use of force and this 
information can sometimes leak to the target country’s population. The only populace that 
remains reliably ambivalent or misinformed is the general US public.  
Governments might attempt to affect public perception of a potential target of aggression 
to engender public support for the use of force. The histories of both covert and overt military 
operations provide a wealth of evidence of the manipulation of public opinion to win citizens’ 
hearts and minds. In 1954, the Eisenhower Administration engineered public consent for a 
Guatemalan coup d'état using a public relations campaign in the North American press. Fear-
mongering propaganda about the “communist leanings” of the Guatemalan president—a “puppet 
of the Soviet Union”—created a negative and fearful perception of the Guatemalan regime in 
American minds. The American news media subsequently misrepresented the coup as a 
successful restoration of democracy in Guatemala, carried out by local freedom fighters. The fact 
that the CIA had masterminded and funded the revolt was excluded from the news (Gleijeses 
1992). This and other historical cases of the intelligent use of propaganda (the British 
government, for example, used the BBS’s Persian service for advancing its anti-Mosaddegh 
agenda in pre-1953 Iran) comport with the logic of the governments’ “clandestine” actions 
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against other democratic states. Since the democratic governments are both constrained by and 
concerned with their popular legitimacy, they will engage in acts of coercion against other 
democracy only to the extent that they are able to make their actions seem legitimate through the 
elaborate myths of legitimation and/or conceal them. Whether the government creates these 
public perceptions is beyond the scope of this paper, but our studies provide evidence that the US 
government may be taking public perception into account when crafting its foreign policy action.  
 Certainly other Western liberal democracies have been implicated in direct and indirect 
support of covert operations against other democratic states. Following the Second World War, 
the US and UK set up a network of paramilitary forces for countering possible invasion of the 
armies of states from the Warsaw Pact. During the Cold War, these networks were turned into 
what became known as NATO’s “secret armies” operated by the military intelligence services of 
European states. Trained in covert operation and subversion techniques, these armies were used 
in a series of clandestine violent actions against “threatening” regimes—often democratic—in 
Europe and other parts of the world (Ganser 2005).  
Legitimacy is important to authorities because it allows them the ability to act and have 
their actions supported more easily than if it is absent. A government that lacks legitimacy must 
then rely on force to get its citizens to comply with its actions and policies. For these reasons it is 
desirable for a government to try and maintain its legitimacy by acting consistently with public 
perception, and when its actions are out of step with the public’s opinion it will attempt to hide 
those actions so their legitimacy is not questioned. 
 The normative constraints from the public, however, could conceivable apply at the elite 
levels as well. Kim and Kundt (2012) analyze the case of US covert intervention in Chile and 
develop hypotheses regarding democratic peace by examining just this interaction between the 
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normative demands of popular opinion and the institutionally-bound constraints afforded 
potentially belligerent democracies. They argue that the US intervention in democratic Chile was 
covert precisely because of a prevailing public mood opposed to military ventures. They go on to 
consider that “…a path to regime change typified by covert action rather than open warfare 
implies a lower degree of cohesion within the policy-making elite….some elites in the State 
Department opposed the intervention in Chile on philosophical grounds. It seems that one of the 
reasons why the elites undertook covert operations was to circumvent normative restraints.”  
Although we have not sought to test elite perceptions of legitimacy, the intriguing possibility 
persists that policy divisions—inspired by debate born of questions of legitimacy—could, 
somewhat ironically, result in covert actions.   
 Our findings also have implications for post-covert action behavior once a covert 
operation is revealed. If balance is an operational factor, we would expect to see concerted 
efforts to justify the behavior by realigning public sentiments. This might take the form of 
denying the democratic qualities of the target: “When it was no longer feasible to conceal their 
involvement in Chile, US elites attempted to depict Allende as an evil figure.” (Kim & Kundt, p. 
65).  This denigration matches hostile action with an evil figure, and thus restores balance and 
preserves legitimacy.  
Democratic peace has given rise to a great deal of scholarly debate in part because of its 
potential implications for the dominant theories in international relations. If democracies avoid 
war with other democracies, realist theories are presumably weakened. Driven by the mandates 
of anarchy and self-interests, realist accounts of state behavior do not well tolerate varying 
standards of behavior for different potential adversaries based on type of government. Liberal 
theories, on the other hand, allow more room for cooperation under anarchy, given the right 
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circumstances. If democratic dyads behave no differently than any other type of dyad, a 
substantial empirical asset is potentially lost to the self-help, self-interest version of international 
affairs purported by realism. 
The studies presented here cannot hope to fully adjudicate such a foundational and 
enduring debate. Rather, we offer a psychological perspective that might help account for states’ 
strategies. Democratic states pursue their national interests, but they appear to do so with 
deference to the powerful normative influence of public perceptions. Whether elites wring their 
hands over potential breaches of the democratic covenant is open for debate, but US foreign 
policy behavior seems to suggest deep recognition of the consequences of such breaches. Why 
hide these acts from the public?  Of course, covert action is not undertaken for the sole purpose 
of hiding acts from the US public. There are many audiences to international relations.  But why 
would we expect a different rate of use of covert force toward democracies than toward non-
democracies?  Such an argument has more trouble explaining our extraordinary rendition 
findings, where the detention itself is a fait accompli and the rendition itself (we argue) merely 
acts to remove the detainee from the public spotlight.   
Although many have seen the fact of non-war aggression between democracies as an 
indication that the so-called “law” of international relations is suspect, we disagree.  Covert 
violence, we argue, results from elites who are constrained by public sentiments, which 
themselves are rooted in a need for perceptual consistency. As citizens become aware of the 
inconsistencies between their value of peaceful conflict resolution, on the one hand, and the 
aggressive behaviors of their own government, on the other, the great democratic experiment 
itself becomes unbalanced.  Covert policies are the sometimes result of the competing mandates 
of perceived national interests countered by the constraining force of democratic values. When 
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elite actors wish to pursue a policy at odds with the democratic peace, to preserve their 
legitimacy they engage in hostilities clandestinely.  
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Figure 1: Correlation of perceived ally status by perceived democracy 
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Figure 2a: Perceived democracy of Iran by U.S. Ally Status 
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Figure 2b: Perceived U.S. Ally Status of Iran by Level of Democracy 
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Table 1: UN Correlations, Study 1 
       Democracy   Ally            Similar  
 
Ally  -.23**    
 
Similar -.22*    .63**   
 
Important         -.01               .24*    .69** 
 
Note: N=190, * p<.001, **p<.0001 
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Table 2. U.S. Government Covert Military Actions Used in Study 2. 
Year 
Action 
Began 
Main Target of 
American Covert 
Action 
Description of Covert Action 
1949 Syria Syrian coup d'état 
1951 Albania Guerilla uprisings throughout country 
1953 Iran Overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh 
1954 Guatemala Overthrow of President Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán 
1955 Costa Rica Attempted ouster of President José Figueres 
1957 Syria Attempted coup d’etat, President Adib Shishakli 
1958 Lebanon CIA funds pro-West politicians, U.S. forces later invade 
1959 China (Tibet) CIA armed an anti-Communist insurgency 
1959 Haiti Marine landing 
1961 Cuba Bay of Pigs 
1961 Ecuador President Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra forced to resign 
1962 British Guiana Protest and general strike 
1963 Ecuador Ouster of President Carlos Julio Arosemana 
1963 South Vietnam Coup against President Ngô Đình Diệm 
1964 Brazil Overthrow of government of President Joao Goulart 
1965 France Attempted assassination of President Charles De Gaulle 
1965 Indonesia Rebellion against President Sukarno 
1966 Guatemala Counter-insurgency campaign 
1966 Ghana Coup ousts President Kwame Nkrumah 
1970 Cambodia Coup against Prince Sihanouk, 7-year bombing campaign 
1973 Chile Overthrow and ouster of President Salvador Allende 
1976 Angola Pro-Soviet forces battle pro-democracy forces 
1976  Argentina Argentine coup d'état 
1980 Turkey Turkish coup d'état 
1984 Nicaragua Destabilization of Sandinistas government 
1987 Iran Iran-Contra affair 
1991 Haiti Military coup ousts President Jean-Bertrand Aristide 	
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Table 3: Overt vs. covert actions by democracy status using two democracy standards.  
—————————————————————————————————— 
 
   N  Overt  Covert  Ratio of Overt to  
         Covert Actions 
Inclusive Definition of Democracy 
Non-Democracy 223  209  14        14.9 
 Percentage   93.7%  6.3% 
 
 Democracy    35  22  13          1.7 
 Percentage   62.9%  37.1% 
 
 
Strict Definition of Democracy 
 
 Non-Democracy 241  219  22        10.0 
 Percentage   90.9%  9.1% 
 
 Democracy    17  12    5          2.4 
 Percentage   70.6%  29.4% 
 
 
Totals   258  231   27 
     89.5%  10.5% 
 
 
 
For Inclusive definition, χ2 (1df) =30.76, p<.0001; for Strict definition, χ2 (1df) =6.97, p=.008. 
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Table 4: Number of detainees held by level of democracy in nation of origin.  
 
                  Ratio of Guantanamo   
   N     Guantanamo        Rendition     to Extraordinary Rendition 
Inclusive Definition of Democracy 
 
Non-Democracy 716  687  35            19.6 
 Percentage   95.2%  4.8% 
 
Democracy  91  67  18             3.72 
 Percentage   78.8%  21.2% 
Strict Definition of Democracy 
 
 Non-Democracy 755  714  41            17.4 
 Percentage   94.6%  5.4% 
 
 Democracy    52  40  12             3.33 
 Percentage   76.9%  23.1% 
———————————————————————————————— 
Totals   807  754  53 
     93.4%  6.6% 
—————————————————————————————————— 
For Inclusive definition, χ2 (1df) =33.04; p<.001, for Strict definition, χ2 (1df) =24.69, p<.001. 
 
 
 
